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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
brought by employees against their employers. Hopefully the Siragusa
reasoning will precipitate a return to first principles of analysis in more
than just employer-employee cases. Siragusa could well mark the
beginning of clarification of an entire area of tort law, now befuddled
by the maxim volenti non fit injuria.
VIRGINIA A. OLDow
Gross Negligence Under the Guest Statute. The first definitive
interpretation of "gross negligence" within the meaning of the 1957
amendment to the Host-Guest Statute has been given by the Washing-
ton court in the case of Crowley v. Barto.2
In this case the administrator of the estate of the deceased brought
a wrongful death action against the defendant, who had been driving
an automobile in which the deceased was a guest. From a judgment of
dismissal following a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed, alleging error in the giving of this instruction on the defini-
tion of "gross negligence":
The term 'gross negligence' as applied to this case means an utter
disregard in the operation of a motor vehicle by the host driver for the
safety of a guest passenger. It is the failure of the host driver to use
slight care for the safety of the guest passenger. (Emphasis added.) 3
In reversing the judgment of dismissal the appellate court took the
position that "utter disregard" meant something more than oversight
or failure to act, but in addition involved "willful or intentional
negligence." The standard of positive disregard is applied only to
cases of "wanton misconduct" and not to cases of "gross negligence,"
and so is inconsistent with the standard set by the Guest Statute.
"Gross negligence" instructions should be phrased only in terms of
"absence of slight care" and not in terms of "utter disregard."
By defining "gross negligence" in this way the court has restored
the rule prevailing in Washington prior to the enactment of the Guest
Statute in 1933," a rule which the statute was presumably passed to
avoid. If one admits that it really was the intention of the legislature
'R.C.W. 46.08.080. As amended the statute makes the host liable to the guest if
"the accident was intentional on the part of the owner or operator, or the result of
said owner's or operator's gross negligence or intoxication." Before the 1957 amend-
ment the host was liable only if the accident was intentional. For a critique of the
amendment by Professor Richards, see Note, 32 W.sH. L. Rzv. 210 (1957).
2 59 Wn.2d 280, 367 P.2d 828 (1962).
3 Crowley v. Barto, 59 Wn.2d 280, 282, 367 P2d 828, 829 (1962).
4 Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P2d 615 (1936).
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to restore this pre-1933 rule, then "absence of slight care" is a correct
way of defining it.' From this standpoint the court's decision in the
case is sound.
The difficulty arises when we try to attach meaning to the phrase
"absence of slight care," and it is in this respect that the Crowley de-
cision is disappointing.
In the first place, it is not at all certain that "gross negligence," as it
is used in the guest statutes, is inconsistent with "wanton misconduct,"
since the majority of states which have adopted guest statutes using
a "gross negligence" standard have interpreted that standard as neces-
sitating a reckless disregard of the rights of others amounting to
"wanton misconduct."
The courts of Michigan,6 Kansas,7 South Dakota,8 North Dakota,9
Virginia,"° and Florida" all have faced the admittedly awkward prob-
lem of defining guest statute "gross negligence," and all have decided
that it does not describe a type of conduct distinct from and less
culpable than "wanton or reckless misconduct." Most recently, the
Oregon Supreme Court, in an exhaustive opinion, - examined the state
of the authorities and decided that so far as the practical administra-
tion of justice was concerned "gross negligence" and "wanton miscon-
duct" were the same. The court fully examined the minute possibilities
of distinction between "gross negligence" and "wanton misconduct,"'"
but noted the liklihood of confusion if "gross negligence" were treated
as a separate class of wrongdoing.' It reasoned that the difficulties
inhering in a practical separation of the two classes were prohibitive.
Significantly, in the Crowley opinion the court cites cases from none of
these jurisdictions.
The Texas court, which uses a "reckless disregard" standard, has
discussed "gross negligence" as if the two terms were synonymous."
Massachusetts, although it apparently attempts to distinguish "gross
5 Craig v. McAtee, 160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146 (1931) ; Klopfenstein v. Eads, 143
Wash. 104, 254 Pac. 854 (1927) ; Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926).
6 Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241 N.W. 851 (1932).
71n re Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951) ; Stout v. Gallemore,
138 Kan. 385, 26 P.2d 573 (1933).
8 Melby v. Anderson, 266 N.W. 135 (S.Dak. 1936). South Dakota has since
deleted the words "gross negligence" from its statute.
9 Posey v. Krogh, 65 N.Dak. 490, 259 N.W. 757 (1935) ; Rokusek v. Bertsch, 78
N.Dak. 420, 50 N.W.2d 657 (1951).
10 Millard v. Cohen, 187 Va. 44, 46 S.E.2d 2 (1948).
11 Dewald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1952).
12 Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 354 P.2d 56 (1960).
"s 354 P.2d at 66.
14 Ibid.
15 Gough v. Fincher, 228 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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negligence" from "wanton misconduct,"' 6 nevertheless phrases thi
standard in terms of "utter disregard,"'" and several writers have
concluded that there is little distinction between "gross negligence" in
Massachusetts and "wanton misconduct" in other states.' s
The Washington court has itself stated, "[W] e do not think it can
be said that heedlessness or reckless disregard for the rights of others
establishes any rule of liability varying appreciably from that of gross
negligence.
'19
There is a second important difficulty with the court's decision in the
Crowley case. Many of the guest statute cases involve jury trials, and
the jury needs an understandable instruction to serve as a basis for
decision. A jury instruction incorporating a definition of "gross negli-
gence" simply as "absence of slight care" is so devoid of content, and
so empty of meaning, that no jury is likely to give it an intelligent
appraisal."
On the other hand, "wanton misconduct" does have meaning,2' and
does provide something understandable. As defined by the Restate-
ment of Torts," "wanton misconduct" is distinct from simple negli-
gence in that it involves a mental state in which the actor intends to
do the act and knows that there is a strong probability that serious
harm will be inflicted on another. It is distinct from intentional wrong-
doing in that he does not intend to inflict the harm. Rather, he Is
indifferent and does not care whether harm results.
When one places simple negligence at one end of the scale and in-
tentional wrongdoing at the other, there is little room for distinctions
in any third class of conduct which intervenes, whether that conduct
be characterized as an aggravated form of negligence or as exhibiting
some sort of quasi-intent. 3 The distinction between "gross negligence"
and "simple negligence" has in fact been simply this: acts which are
"grossly negligent" are so regarded because of the relative amount of
deliberateness or indifference to consequences with which they are
16Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505 (1919).
17 Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass. 494, 159 N.E. 440 (1928).
'Is Note, 35 Micr. L. REv. 804 (1937) ; Note, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 621, 627 (1932)..
10 Craig v. McAtee, 160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146, 148 (1931). See Eubanks v.
Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.2d 48 (1933).2 0 Note, 32 WAsH. L. REv. 210 (1957).
21 Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 354 P.2d 56 (1960); PRossER, TORTS §
33 (2d ed. 1955).
22 RSTATMENT, TORTS § 500 (1934).2 3 
"Since recklessness often is inferred from any highly dangerous conduct there
seldom is any clear distinction between 'wanton' and 'gross' negligence." PRossaa,
TORTS 151 (2d ed. 1955).
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done,"4 and this indifference to consequences is the same thing as a
species of "wanton or reckless conduct.)2 5
Where is the line to be drawn? Is inadvertence enough to amount to
'"gross negligence"? If so, why is it any different from simple negli-
gence? If not, why is it any different from "wanton misconduct,"
which takes into consideration states of mind? When is conduct serious
enough to be "gross" but not serious enough to be in "utter disregard"?
What are the tests, the factors and the language which will guide the
court in making a delineation, no matter how imprecise, between
"absence of slight care" and "failure to use reasonable care under the
circumstances?" Most important, how can a jury give a verdict which
accurately reflects the court's language and do it with some consist-
ency? Is it not impossible unless we move up the scale to the point
at which the defendant has become conscious of the danger and elects
to encounter it, or at least becomes indifferent to it?
The continued and puzzling inclination of legislatures to use "gross
negligence" as a standard of care in host-guest statutes presents any
court with an obvious challenge. By defining "gross negligence" simply
as "absence of slight care" the Washington court has taken the easy
way out. The expectable result of this decision is more work for the
court, as both juries and trial judges struggle to find meaning in a
phrase than has no meaning. DWAYNE COPPLE
Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Injury. Until
recently, a plaintiff who had suffered emotional injury normally
had to show an accompanying physical harm in order to maintain a
successful action for damages. His ability to recover for severe emo-
tional distress unaccompanied by physical injury is being recognized
by an increasing number of jurisdictions. The current situation is
marked by the unsettled nature of the law. Reluctance to grant re-
lief for such an injury has been based upon a desire to avoid not only
fictitious claims, but also the litigation of trivialities and bad manners.
However, even before this change in attitude by the courts, if some
independent tort, such as assault, battery, or false imprisonment could
be made out, that cause of action served as a peg upon which to hang
the recovery for emotional injury, and recovery was freely permitted.
In recent years the courts have tended to recognize the intentional
-4 Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 354 P.2d 56 (1960) ; Note, 35 MIcH. L.
REv. 804 (1937).
25 RESTATEMIENT, TORTS § 500 (1934).
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